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I 
Introduction 
 
I.1 Background 
In midst of March 2011, the people and the government of Indonesia were once again 
shocked by some acts of terrorist in this country. But this time, the terrorist used a 
different way to terror the people. They put bombs in a book. This book parcel bombs 
then delivered to some people. They are Ulil Abshar Abdala, an activist of Jaringan 
Islam Liberal (JIL), the musician Ahmad Dhani, General Komisaris Pol Gorries Mere, 
Yapto S. Soerjosoemarno, a member of Pancasila Youth, and previous Chief of West 
Java District Police.1  
Previously, at the end of February 2010, the government also found some 
terrorist did their paramilitary training in Aceh, a place where a conflict once had 
occurred between the government of Indonesia and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), a 
movement to freed Aceh that had been existed for almost 30 years. At that time, some 
terrorism observers were sure that terrorist used separatist as their partner and 
cooperated with them to achieve their goals.  
However, the government of Indonesia convinced that this action has nothing to 
do with the movement (GAM). Since, they believed that the conflict between GAM 
and the government of Indonesia has already ended on 15 August 2005 when both 
parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki. The negotiation 
at that time was mediated by former Finland President, Martti Ahtisaari.  
                                                
1  “Teror Paket Bom Buku lagi” (Another Book Parcel Bomb) accessed from 
http://metro.kompasiana.com/2011/03/18/teror-paket-bom-buku-lagi/ on 1 April 2011. 
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From this paramilitary training, Chief of Public Relations Division in Indonesian 
Police (Polri), Edward Aritonang, on 2nd March 2010 explained that the police had 
caught 13 persons in Aceh Besar, Nangroe Aceh Darussalam, that were indicated as 
members of terrorist networks. All were Indonesian and caught as they were indicated 
doing a military training with an Indonesian trainer who has been trained abroad. The 
police got this information from some documents seized by the police. Besides, the 
police also seized three fire arms and eight bullets from their training place as well.2  
One week later, the police caught other terrorists in Pamulang, Tangerang. 
There were 4 persons in Jakarta and West Java. Three of them were shot in an internet 
workshop as they tried to fight and escape from the police. Edward Aritonang was 
sure that these performers were linked with the terrorist group in Aceh. Again 
according to Aritonang, these performers were functioned as weapon suppliers and 
fund raisers for their paramilitary activities in Aceh.3  
Head of Anti-terror Desk in Coordinator Ministerial of Political, Law and 
Security, Ansya’ad Mbai, said that the presence and activities of terrorist in Aceh 
Besar could be a part of a new great scenario to prepare an attack Malacca Strait. 
Although this people haven’t realized yet about the plan and even though the facilities 
to support was still not ready yet but this cell group can be part of Jaringan Islamiyah 
or Al Qaeda who had arrange a big attack. He believed this because terrorist group 
will always have a sophisticated plan and work method to attack their potential 
targets. And their targets will always develop and never be static.4  
                                                
2  Polri Tangkap 13 Teroris di Aceh (Indonesian Police Caught 13 Terrorists in Aceh) accessed from 
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/1267545515/polri-tangkap-13-teroris-di-aceh, on 1 August 2010. 
3  Pemberi Dana Teroris Aceh (Fund Raiser for Terrorist in Aceh), accessed from 
http://www.detiknews.com/read/2010/03/09/183011/1314802/10/polri-kelompok-pamulang-
pemasok-senjata-pemberi-dana-teroris-aceh, on 1 Aug 2010. 
4  Keberadaan Teroris di Aceh untuk Siapkan Skenario Teror Besar Baru (The Presence of Terrorist in Aceh is To Prepare a 
New Great Scenario Terror) accessed from 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/03/09/2223324/Keberadaan.Teroris.di.Aceh.untuk.Siapkan.Sk
enario.Teror.Besar.Baru, on 1 Aug 2010. 
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As we know, Malacca Strait is one of the most important and busiest lanes in the 
world. More than 50,000 vessels pass through this strait. These vessels carry almost 
38% of world trading, and almost 60% of gas and oil resources needed by Japan and 
China. It means Malacca strait holds a very important role to the international trading 
and economic. However, this strategic strait is joined by some dangerous, particularly 
pirates and terrorist group. Thus, it is possible that this terrorist group will cooperate 
with the sea pirates to destroy the international trading in Malacca Strait.  
Once they bomb this strait, many countries will suffered from economic and 
resources loss, particularly Japan, China and United States. That is one reason they try 
hard to persuade Indonesian government to cooperate in fighting against terrorism in 
Malacca Strait, to keep this strait secure.  
Indonesia has experienced more than 20 times of terrorist attacks since year 
2000.5 The first attack that claimed by the police carried out by the terrorist group in 
Indonesia happened on 1 August 2000. At that time, a bomb exploded in Philippine 
embassy. The explosion came from a car parked in front of the Ambassador of 
Philippine’s residence. These attacks then continued with a bomb in Malaysian 
embassy, bomb in Gedung Bursa Efek Jakata, and a series of bomb at some churches 
in Indonesia on Christmas eves. 
In September 2001, there was a bomb at Atrium Plaza, Senen, Central Jakarta. 
Afterwards, there was a bomb in fast food restaurant in Makasar, South Sulawesi and 
a month after this attack, there was a bomb at Australian International School, Jakarta. 
In new-year eve at 2002, a grenade exploded in a restaurant in Bulungan Jakarta. And 
during this year, there were a series of bomb attacks at churches in Palu. One of the 
                                                                                                                                       
 
5  http://indocashregister.com/2009/07/18/rentetan-serangan-bom-teroris-di-indonesia-2000-2009/ 
accessed on 2 August 2010 
 
 5 
biggest terrorist attacks in this country was Bomb Bali that occurred in 12 October 
2002, in which 202 victims died and mostly were Australian. Several weeks later, in 
December 2002, there was another explosion in Mc Donald’s restaurant, in Makasar. 
Another assembled bomb exploded in front of Police Headquarters Jakarta on 3 
February 2003 and in Soekarno-Hatta airport, Cengkareng, on 27 April 2003. And on 
5 August 2004, there was a bomb in JW Marriott hotel that caused about 11 people 
died and 152 people injured. Afterwards, there were several bombs exploded in a café 
in Papolo, Sulawesi, in Australian embassy, Jakarta and in Immanuel Church in Palu 
Central Sulawesi.. 
In 2005, there were two bombs exploded in Ambon and in front of Abu Jibril’s 
house, one of policy makers for Majelis Mujahidin, in Pamulang, Tangerang. In the 
same year, Bali suffered again from bomb exploded in 5 October, at Raja Bar Kuta 
and Jimbaran Café. Another bomb in Palu exploded once again on 31 December 
2005.  
Afterwards, Indonesia seemed to be more peaceful during the President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla regime between 2005 and 2009. 
However there were bomb explosions in Hotel JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton in July 
2009. The bombs exploded early in the morning and almost at the same time. This 
accident obviously shocked not only the people of Indonesia but mostly the 
government.  
It happened exactly nine days after the election’s day in Indonesia and two days 
before the visit of Manchester United team. This attack made some terrorism 
observers believed that this time the motif of terrorist attack has changed. It means 
that not only did the terrorist group try to attack the American, Australian or 
foreigners who stay in Indonesia and their properties but also the Indonesian 
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government and its agencies. Even, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for several 
times explained that some terrorists carried out their military training by using his 
picture as their target.6 
The terrorist group military training in Aceh is another example. When this 
group was raided by the police in early of March 2010, some members of this group 
shot Indonesian police. Besides, when there was a robbery in a bank in Medan, North 
Sumatera which indicated carried out by terrorist group in mid-August 2010, the 
performers shot a police and two bank’s security officers to death. After this raid, the 
policemen directly searched, caught and shot some robbers who were predicted as the 
members of Jamaah Islamiyah, in Tanjung Balai, Deli Serdang and Medan. But then, 
the group that leaded by Abu Tholut took revenge by attacking a sector police office 
in Hamparan Perak, North Sumatera, last September 2010, and murdered at least three 
policemen there.7  
From the raid of the terrorist group in Pamulang, Aceh and North Sumatera, 
Indonesian Police found some long distance bomb triggers, air rifles, pistols, 
ammunitions and fire arms such as AK-47, M-16, AK-56, FN, Revolver and 
thousands bullets. It convinced the police that now the terrorist group is trying to 
attack the government officer directly instead of bombing the foreigner’s properties.  
 
I.2 Question Research  
It has been more than 10 years since the first attack of terrorist networks in Indonesia. 
And the police have tried many efforts to catch terror performers for this decade. 
Although the performers have been caught, sent to prison and even shot to death, the 
                                                
6  SBY: Wajah Saya Dijadikan Sasaran Tembak Teroris (SBY: My Picture Was Used As A Shooting 
Target by Terrorist), accessed from http://news.okezone.com/read/2009/07/17/1/239722/sby-
wajah-saya-dijadikan-sasaran-tembak-teroris on 16 August 2010. 
7  “Aksi Jaringan Sang Gubernur Militer” (Act of The Military Governor’s Network), Tempo, No. 
3931/27 September – 3 October 2010, pp 108-113. 
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terrors keep happening in this country. It continues to occur and causes many losses. 
Moreover the target itself has changed. From the above explanation then we arrive to 
the questions that will be answered from this research: 
1. How is the terrorism handling actually carried out in Indonesia?  
2. Why the actions or the terrorist group activities in Indonesia could not be 
stopped totally? 
 
I.3 Goals and Purposes of Research 
This research will examine the way of the government of Indonesia in handling 
terrorism in its country. Therefore, this research is expected: 
1. To describe in details what kind of activities carried out by the government of 
Indonesia particularly the police and Special Detachment 88 in countering 
terrorism in this country. 
2. To describe any obstacles that faced by the government of Indonesia to 
counter terrorist actions.  
3. To explain what makes the terrorism group and their activities remain 
continue in Indonesia.  
 
I.5 Methodology 
This research will examine the above questions by using some literatures from 
newspaper, magazines, journals, government documents as well as interview with 
Indonesian Police and other related agency regarding this matter. And since the data 
are in the form of words, sentences, paragraphs, and observations then I use 
qualitative research strategies in this research.  
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Besides, I use case study approach since I try to go into greater depth and get 
more details on terrorism handling in Indonesia and the explanation why it is difficult 
to stop it.8   
 
I.6 Theories 
The activities of terror have been used since thousand years ago. Originally, terror 
was used to defeat enemy. In ancient Greek history, Xenophon (431 – 354 BC), an 
Athenian who was exiled then joined the Spartan, tried to use the psychological 
warfare as a tool to weaken enemy. At that time, using poison and carrying out a 
secret revolt to beat their enemies were common things to do. Furthermore, Kautilya 
in his book, Arthasahastra, wrote that Tunim Yudha or secretly war can also be used 
to beat the enemies.9   
Terror then developed into a way to against certain regime, particularly the 
dictatorial one. Terror activities were chosen by Zealot group (66 – 73 AD) during the 
Roman occupation in Judea territory. This group refused Roman occupation since 
they believed that Roman rule was incompatible with Jewish freedom, and that the 
Jews should be free of Roman control. They fought for Jewish’s purity in religious 
aspect so strict that they refused any behavior that considered against the Jewish Law. 
Zealot’s member group usually mingled with the people in market and public area. 
And whenever they saw a violation, they took out their dagger from their robe and 
stabbed the transgressor.10  
                                                
8  See W. Lawrence Neuman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 
Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1997, pp 327-341. 
9  Adjie. S, Terorisme, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2005, pp 1-3. Read also Jack Douglas and 
Frances Chaput Waksler, “Kekerasan” in Teori-teori Kekerasan, edited by Thomas Santoso, 
Jakarta, PT Ghalia Indonesia, 2002, p 18. To know more about the idea and war strategy of 
Xenophon, you may also look at his book “Hellenica” that can be accessed from 
http://books.google.com/books?id=Ver3NTRYvcAC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summ
ary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false, 2 December 2010. 
10  Adjie, ibid. 
 9 
During this time, Zealot had become the political party that opposed Herodes’ 
regime as well. For many people the attacks that carried out by this group caused 
terror and fear to them. However according to the member group this action was 
motivated by the religious teaching that supported by their holy book. And they just 
wanted to maintain their purity and religious teachings.  
Almost in the same idea with Zealot group, Ku Klux Klan ran some terror 
actions as well. After the Civilian War in America (1861 – 1865), some reactionaries 
in South America created a terrorist group, Ku Klux Klan. The members of this group 
tried to intimidate government’s supporters simply to perform their dislike to 
government.11  
On contrary, a regime can do the same thing. In the name of protecting power 
and justice, Robespierre, the leader of French Revolution commanded to catch more 
than 300.000 people and executed more than 17.000 of them with an engineered 
court. He even commanded his guard to cut his political enemies’ head off during his 
regime.12 
Since the 20th centuries, the terrorism has changed its face again. Not only in 
their motivation but also in the networks and weapons they used. Terrorism has 
become a part and characteristic of social and political movement in one country. And 
now, terrorism actions involved not only one country but also many countries. A 
terrorist group in one country usually funded by second country, training in third 
country, weapon provided by fourth country, and operated in fifth country. For 
example the terrorist group that killed many people in Lod Airport in Israeli, came 
                                                
11  Jack Douglas and Frances Chaput Waksler, op.cit. 
12  A.M. Hendropriyono, Terorisme: Fundamentalis Kristen, Yahudi, Islam (Terrorism: 
Fundamentalist Christian, Jewish, Islam), Jakarta, Kompas, 2009, pp 61-62.   
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from Japan, trained in Korea, weapon provided by Italy and funded by West Germany 
and its action has attracted the sympathy of some Arab countries.13 
The term terrorism comes from Latin word “terrere” or “terror” means 
something that can cause a dreadful fear; a frightening situation; or an ability to bring 
fear.14 In 1937, following the assassination of a Yugoslavian king and a French 
foreign minister by ethnic separatists, The League of Nations attempted to generically 
define terrorism for the first time as “All criminal acts directed against a State and 
intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a 
group of persons or the general public.”15  
Adjie Suradji, Indonesian Air Force pilot who criticized the President of  
Indonesia last September, in his book defined terrorism as an ideology that through 
force tries to express a message, by using illegal actions such as harshness, cruelty 
and murdering. And the actor, individually or group, who uses those illegal actions is 
named terrorist. As a terrorist group, its movement should have an effective 
leadership and strongly supported by its member, particularly the people who support 
fund for the group and the people that has the same ideology with them.16  
Furthermore, as quoted in Hendropriyono, Walter Reich defined terrorism as a 
strategy of violence designed to promote desired outcomes by instilling fear in the 
public at large. Besides, Brian Jenkins interprets terrorism as the use of force designed 
to bring about political change. Paul Johnson describes terrorism as a deliberate, 
systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear in order to 
                                                
13  Ibid., p 4-6. Read also Rohan Gunaratna, “Introduction: Change of Continuity” in The Changing 
Face of Terrorism, Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 2004, pp 1-15.  
14  Budi Gunawan, Terorisme: Mitos dan Konspirasi (Terrorism: Myth and Conspiracy), Jakarta, 
Forum Media Utama, 2006. 
15  Accessed from http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/ss/DefineTerrorism_2.htm, on 2 
December 2010. 
16  Adjie, op.cit., , p 11. 
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gain political end. Thus in his mind, terrorism is politically evil, necessarily evil and 
wholly evil.17  
From many definitions of terrorism performed in his book, Hendropriyono then 
concluded that terrorism has no value. There are no ethic values about good or bad, 
morality norms about right or wrong, and aesthetic values about beauty or not beauty. 
The only language that shown in terrorism is how to bring fear and panic in public, 
and this is universal. They use force and threat, physically or mentally to anybody 
without exception. And this fear is used for public support to his goals. Thus, 
according to Hendropriyono, terrorism is a criminal shown by some parties whose 
values lie on their own mind.18 
Therefore, to counter terrorism obviously needs an effective counter-terrorism 
capacity. Learning from the 9/11 attack in America, according to Randy Borum, there 
are five major objectives in counter-terrorism training.19 The first major was that all 
investigators and intelligence personnel at all levels needed to develop greater subject 
matter expertise and therefore they should adapt and modify their skills and basic 
approach to their professional tasks. In this case their main focus was supposed to be 
on prevention that driven by intelligence.  
The second major was to emphasize the importance of prevention, interdiction 
and proactive approaches. Most enforcement resources are deployed after an act has 
occurred while by contrast anti-terrorist operations are supposed to identify and 
interdict terrorist threats before an attack happens. It requires, of course profound 
changes in the way they approach this problem. 
                                                
17  A.M. Hendropriyono, op.cit., pp 25-28.   
18  Ibid., p 38. 
19  Randy Borum, “Counter-Terrorism Training Post-9/11” in The Changing Face of Terrorism, 
edited by Rohan Gunaratna, Singapore, Eastern Universities Press, 2004, pp 62-70. 
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The third major objective was to give operators the necessary tools to enact a 
preventive approach, specially the role of intelligence. It was needed since the nature 
and structure of transnational extremist such as terrorist group are much different than 
that of traditional state-sponsored military forces. They are harder to locate, to 
observe and to infiltrate. 
The fourth objective was to give guidance about how to identify information of 
interest and how to apply it to the new operational objectives of a war on terrorism. 
According to Borum to understanding what extremist groups believe and how they 
operate is important to combat terrorism. Therefore in counter-terrorism training, such 
as that carried out by the national intelligence agencies in America in the post 9/11, a 
deeper understanding of the motives of terrorism and how they influence target 
selection and behavior was required. 
The fifth objective was to enhance and emphasize inter-agency and cross-
disciplinary collaboration. This information was supposed to be shared not only 
between different intelligence agencies but also within agencies and between the 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. As Manning said, quoted in Borum’s 
article, “Without better cooperation, data gatherers will not know what information to 
collect and analysts, and therefore will not have the necessary pieces to assemble or 
forecast a composite of impending threats.”  
 
I.7 Writings Systematic 
Chapter 1  :  is contained the introduction of terrorist actions in Indonesia, the 
research questions that will be answered by the end of this research, 
and some theories that will be used to answer the questions. This 
chapter also contained the goals and purposes of this research, the 
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methodology that conducted to gain data needed to answer the 
research questions and the writing arrangement as well. 
Chapter 2 : is describing the terrorist actions in Indonesia, when and where it 
happened, their leaders, the victims, their motives and the way of the 
government handled those actions. 
Chapter 3 : will explain some factors that caused the terrorist group flourishing 
developed in Indonesia. 
Chapter 4 : is containing the summary and conclusion from the previous chapter.  
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II 
The Chronological of Terrorism in Indonesia 
(Year 2000 – 2010) 
 
II.1  Chronological of Terrorist actions in Indonesia 
Since August 2000, Indonesia has experienced more than 20 times of terrorist 
attacks until the year 2011.20 The form of the attack itself has changed as well as the 
motifs. The terrorist has changed their motifs from attacking foreign interest including 
its people, properties and their business in Indonesia into attacking the interest of the 
government of Indonesia and its agencies, including the police officers, military 
personnel and their offices.    
In year 2000, there were four bombings occurred in the capital city of Indonesia, 
Jakarta, two of which targeted official foreign interests. The first one was exploded at 
the Embassy of Philippine in Menteng, Central Jakarta on 1 August 2000. 
Unidentified assailants detonated a car bomb in front of the Philippine Ambassador's 
residence as the Ambassador was entering the compound. There were 2 Indonesian 
people died and three other persons seriously injured, including the Ambassador, 
Leonides T Caday, and slightly injured 18 bystanders, including one Filipino and two 
Bulgarians.  
After the tragedy, there was another bombing that happened towards another 
embassy in the same month. Unidentified perpetrators also conducted a grenade 
attacked against the Malaysian Embassy in Kuningan, South Jakarta, on 27 August 
2000, but no injuries resulted this time. However the Indonesian police had caught 
and punished some performers of this attack, such as Iwan Setiawan alias Husen, 
                                                
20  Budi Gunawan, op.cit, p 114. Read also Kompas, 8 October 2005.  
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Saifan Nurdin, M. Nurdin and one former police officer, Ibrahim Hasan, with at least 
6 years and 4 months in jail. Yet, in the next month, the terror still continued in Bursa 
Efek Jakarta (Jakarta Stock Exchange).  
The bomb explosion in Jakarta Stock Exchange's happened in underground 
parking floor P2, on 13 September 2000. It was one of the most destructive bombings 
had occurred in Indonesia. It caused 10 people died, 90 injured, 161 cars and some of 
the buildings destroyed. Afterwards, other bombings exploded in the same year, 
exactly on Christmas Eve, 24 December 2000. There were 23 explosions in some 
churches and Christian schools spread out in some cities in Indonesia. These 
explosions caused 16 people died and 96 injured altogether. 
In the year 2001, there was 5 bombings happened in Jakarta. First bombing 
happened on 10 May 2001 at Jalan Guntur, South Jakarta. This time, Yayasan 
Kesejahteraan Mahasiswa Iskandar Muda building was bombed. It caused 3 people 
died and half of the building ruined. The next explosion was happened on 22 July 
2001 at Saint Anna Church in Duren Sawit, and Huria Kristen Batak Protestant 
Church in Jatiwaringin, Kalimalang. Both churches locate in East Jakarta. And once 
again those bombings injured some innocent people.  
Afterwards, Atrium Plaza in Senen, Central Jakarta, became the target of 
terrorist group. They exploded this mall in 23 September 2001 and it caused 6 people 
injured. Then, in 12 October, Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant in Makassar was 
bombed. However no victims that injured or murdered at this attack. Another bomb 
which was located in MLC Life Makassar also planned to explode but luckily it 
failed. Last bombing in this year was happened in Australian International School 
(AIS) in Pejaten, South Jakarta on 6 November 2001. A handmade bomb was 
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exploded at the yard of the school. No victims at this attack but the building 
destroyed. 
In new-year eve at 2002, there was a grenade exploded in a restaurant in 
Bulungan, Jakarta. It caused one people died and another one injured. And during this 
year, there were a series of bomb attacks four churches in Palu and triggered the 
conflict there extended. Furthermore, one of the biggest terrorist attacks in this 
country, Bomb Bali, occurred in 12 October 2002. It caused 202 people died and 
mostly Australian. Several weeks later, in December 2002, there was another 
explosion from assembled bomb in Mac Donald’s restaurant, in Makasar. 
Another assembled bomb exploded in front of Police Headquarters Complex, 
exactly in the lobby of Wisma Bhayangkari, on 3 February 2003 and in Soekarno-
Hatta airport, Cengkareng, on 27 April 2003. A bomb exploded in public area at the 
terminal 2F, in which 2 people were seriously injured and 8 others mild-wounded. 
And on 5 August 2003, there was a bomb in JW Marriott hotel that caused about 11 
people died and 152 people injured.  
In the year of 2004, another serial of bombing happened in Indonesia such as a 
bomb in a café in Palopo, Sulawesi that occurred on 10 January 2004. This attack 
killed four people. And on September 9th 2004, there was Australian Embassy 
bombing. A large explosion occurred in front of Australian Embassy, 5 people were 
killed and hundreds of people injured at that time. The explosion also damaged 
several buildings in the vicinity such as the Plaza 89, Gracia Tower, and BNI 
Building. And in the end of 2004, another bombing happened at Immanuel Church, 
Palu, Central Sulawesi, on 12 December 2004. 
The serial bombing in Indonesia still continued. There were two bombs 
exploded in Ambon on 21 March 2005. Another bombing happened at Tentena on 23 
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Mei 2005, in which 22 peoples were killed. On 8 June, 2005, another bombing 
happened in Pamulang, Tangerang. A bomb exploded in a house of a member of 
Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) M Iqbal alias Abu Jibril 
in West Pamulang. But there were no fatalities. 
In the same year, Bali had suffered again from bomb that exploded in 12 
October, at Raja Bar Kuta and Jimbaran Café. At least 22 people killed and 102 
injured at this attack. Another bomb in Palu exploded once again on 31 December 
2005. It exploded at a market in Palu, Central Sulawesi, and killed 8 people and 
injured at least 45 people. 
Afterwards, Indonesia seemed to be more peaceful during the regime of 
Presiden Susilo and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, until there were bomb explosions in 
Hotel JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton, South Jakarta. The bombs exploded on 17 July 
2009, early in the morning and almost at the same time. These attacks obviously 
shocked not only the people of Indonesia but mostly the government.  
It happened exactly nine days after the election of Presiden Soesilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono and Vice President Boediono and two days before the visit of Manchester 
United team. This attack made some terrorism observers believed that this time the 
motif of terrorist attack has changed. It means that not only did the terrorist group try 
to attack the American, Australian or foreigners who stay in Indonesia with their 
properties, business and interest but also the Indonesian government and its agencies, 
including the police officer, military personnel and their offices.  
Some attacks in 2010 happened as if they confirmed their new motifs. When the 
terrorist group military training in Aceh was raided by the police in early of March 
2010, some members of this group shot Indonesian police. Besides, when this group 
robbed a bank in Medan, North Sumatera in mid-August 2010, the performers shot a 
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police and two bank’s security officers to death. After this raid, the policemen directly 
searched, caught and shot some robbers who were predicted as the members of 
Jamaah Islamiyah, in Tanjung Balai, Deli Serdang and Medan. But then, the group 
that leaded by Abu Tholut took revenge by attacking a sector police office in 
Hamparan Perak, North Sumatera, last September 2010, and murdered at least three 
policemen there.21 
In March 2011, another terror happened again. This time the terrorist used a new 
way to terror the people. They put bombs in books and delivered to some people that 
considered block their actions. Some bombs were delivered to Ulil Abshar Abdala, an 
activist of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), the musician Ahmad Dhani, General 
Komisaris Pol Gorries Mere, Yapto S. Soerjosoemarno, a member of Pancasila 
Youth, and previous Chief of West Java District Police. 
We can see the activities and the performers of terrorism in Indonesia 2000 – 
2010, from the table below22: 
 
Date of Accident 
 
Place of Accident 
 
Remarks 
 
Actors and 
Penalty 
1 August 2000 Philippines 
Embassy, in Jakarta.  
An assembled bomb 
exploded inside a car that 
parked in front of the 
Ambassador of 
Philippines’ house in 
Menteng, central Jakarta. 
This explosion killed 2 
people and wounded other 
21 people, included the 
Ambassador, H.E Leonides 
T. Caday. 
Abdul Jabar bin 
Ahmad Kandai 
(got verdict 20 
years in prison). 
Fatur Rahman Al-
Ghozi and Edi 
Setiono (all his life 
imprisonment) 
27 August 2000 Malaysian Embassy, A grenade exploded in Iwan Setiawan 
                                                
21  “Aksi Jaringan Sang Gubernur Militer” (Act of The Military Governor’s Network), Tempo, No. 
3931/27 September – 3 October 2010, pp 108-113. 
22  Budi Gunawan, op.cit., pp 114-116. See also “Ledakan Bom di Jakarta Sejak Tahun 2000” (Bom 
Explosions in Jakarta since 2000) accessed from 
http://www.kompas.com/lipsus072009/ledakanmegakuningan, http://www.gatra.com/2001-08-
06/artikel.php?id=8939; 
http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2002/10/21/LU/mbm.20021021.LU81897.id.html 
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in Jakarta. Complex of Malaysian 
Embassy in Kuningan, 
Central Jakarta. No victims 
at that moment. 
alias Husen (6 
years and 4 months 
imprisonment), 
Saifan Nurdin (6 
years and 4 months 
imprisonment ), M. 
Mudin (8 years 
imprisonment), 
and Praka Ibrahim 
Hasan (all his life 
imprisonment)  
13 September 
2000 
Jakarta Stock 
Exchange Building, 
Jakarta. 
A big explosion happened 
in parking area P2 of 
Jakarta Stock Exchange 
Buildings, Jakarta. 10 
people died, 90 people 
wounded and 161 cars 
damaged. 
Tengku Ismuhadi 
(all life 
imprisonment), 
Iwan Setiawan,  
Saifan Nurdin, M. 
Mudin, Praka 
Ibrahim Hasan, 
Irwan bin Ilyas (all 
life imprisonment), 
Ibrahim Abdul 
Wahab.  
24 December 
2000 
Christmas’s Eve 
Bombings. 
Series of explosions 
happened in some cities in 
Indonesia, such as in 
Jakarta, Bekasi, Sukabumi, 
Bandung, Mojokerto, 
Mataram, Pematang 
Siantar, Batam and 
Pekanbaru. There were 23 
churches attacked, 16 
people died, 96 people 
injured, and 37 cars 
damaged altogether. 
Zoesfriyoes bin 
Yunus alias Datok 
Rajo Ameh alias 
Mukhtar Tanjung 
(got verdict 3 
years), Abdul 
Jabar, Edi Setiono 
alias Abas (all his 
life imprisonment), 
Asep alias Darmin 
alias Abdulah 
(fugitive), Ibrahim 
(fugitive), Musa 
(Malaysian, 
fugitive),  Dani 
(Malaysian, 
imprisonment), 
and Toni Togar 
(20 years verdict)  
10 May 2001 Yayasan 
Kesejahteraan 
Mahasiswa Iskandar 
Muda (Foundation 
of the Welfare of 
Iskandar Muda’s 
Students), Jl. 
Guntur, South 
Jakarta. 
An assembled bomb 
exploded in the building 
and caused half of the 
building damaged and 
killed 3 people as well. 
Muslihuddin 
Muarif (4 years 
imprisonment), 
Taufik Abdullah (1 
year 
imprisonment), 
Mushalli (2 years 
imprisonment 
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22 July 2001 Santa Ana Church in 
Pondok Bambu and 
Huria Kristen Batak 
Protestant Church in 
Jatiwaringin, East 
Jakarta. 
The bombs exploded in the 
morning when the pastor 
was serving the Sunday 
ministry. The bombs 
injured tens people who 
were attended the church.  
Dani alias Taufik 
bin Abdullah 
Halim (20 years 
imprisonment), Edi 
Setiono alias 
Abbas (all his life 
imprisonment). 
23 September 
2001 
Atrium Plaza, 
Senen, Central 
Jakarta. 
An assembled bomb 
exploded in Atrium Plaza, 
Jakarta, near Pizza Hut 
Restaurant, and wounded 6 
people. 
Edi Setiono alias 
Abbas and Taufik 
bin Abdul Halim.  
12 October 2001 Kentucky Fried 
Chicken Restaurant 
in Makassar. 
A bomb exploded in KFC 
restaurant and damaged the 
restaurant, but no victims. 
Another bomb put in MLC 
Life office but failed to 
explode.  
 
6 November 2001 Australian 
International School 
(AIS) in Pejaten, 
South Jakarta 
An assembled bomb 
exploded in the school 
park. 
 
9 November 2001 Petra Church in 
Koja, Jakarta. 
An assembled bomb 
exploded in the church and 
caused damage to the 
building only. 
Ujang Haris and 
Wahyu Handoko 
(both are still in 
processed)  
1 January 2002 New Year’s eve 
bombings. 
Series of bombings 
happened in a restaurant in 
Jakarta with 1 people died 
and another one injured, 
and four churches in Palu – 
Central Sulawesi but no 
victim.  
Hasballah (dead 
because of the 
grenade), and 
Tarmizi (still in 
processed)  
 
12 October 2002 Paddy's Cafe and 
Sari Club, Kuta, 
Bali 
 
Three bombs exploded in 
Bali. 202 people mostly 
were Australian died and 
more than 300 people 
wounded. In the same time, 
an assembled bomb 
exploded in Philippines’s 
Consular General’s office 
in Manado, North 
Sulawesi. 
Abdul Goni (all 
life imprisonment) 
Abdul Hamid, 
Abdul Rauf, Imam 
Samudra (death 
penalty), Achmad 
Roichan, Ali 
Ghufron alias 
Mukhlas (death 
penalty)Ali Imron 
alias Alik (all life 
imprisonment), 
Amrozi bin 
Nurhasyim alias 
Amrozi (death 
penalty), Andi 
Hidayat, Andi 
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Oktavia, Arnasan 
alias Jimi (died), 
Bambang Setiono,  
Budi Wibowo, Dr 
Azahari alias Alan 
(died in raid by 
police in Kota 
Batu, 9 November 
2005); Dulmatin 
(died on 9 Maret 
2010), Feri alias 
Isa (died), 
Herlambang, 
Hernianto, Idris 
alias Johni 
Hendrawan, 
Junaedi, Makmuri,  
Mohammad 
Musafak, 
Mohammad Najib 
Nawawi, Toni 
Togar (20 years 
verdict), Umar 
Kecil alias Patek 
(caught in 
Pakistan), Utomo 
Pamungkas alias 
Mubarok (all life 
verdict), 
Zulkarnaen  
5 December 2002 Mc Donald 
Restaurant in 
Makassar 
An assembled bomb 
exploded in the restaurant 
and caused 3 people died 
and 11 injured. 
Agung Abdul 
Hamid alias Ansar 
alias Yakup alias 
Budi, Mirzal alias 
Ghozi (fugitive) 
and Hizbullah 
Rasyid (fugitive)  
3 February 2003 In front of 
Indonesian Police 
Headquarter 
complex, Wisma 
Bhayangkari. 
No victim.  
27 April 2003 Terminal 2F, 
Cengkareng Airport. 
10 people wounded.  
5 August 2003 Hotel J.W Marriot. A suicide bomb in a car 
driven by Asmar Latin 
Sani exploded and 
damaged some parts of 
Hotel Marriot. 12 people 
died and more than 150 
Noordin M Top 
(died in raid by 
police in Solo, 
Central Java), 
Asmar Latin Sani 
(suicide bomber) 
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injured. 
10 January 2004 Café in Palopo, 
South Sulawesi. 
An assembled bomb 
exploded and caused 4 
people died and 2 others 
injured. 
Jasmin, Arman, 
Komar, dan 
Jasman (Jasmin’s 
brother), Ahmad 
(fugitive), Ahmad 
Rijal, Yedi, 
Binardi, Arnan, 
and Idil. All are in 
law processed. 
9 September 2004 Australian Embassy A big explosion from a car 
parked in front of 
Australian Embassy caused 
9 people died, hundreds 
people injured and the 
building of Australian 
Embassy damaged. 
Noordin M Top, 
Heri Gholun 
(suicide bomber), 
Air Setiawan (died 
in raid by police in 
Jatiasih, Bekasi), 
Jaja (died in raid 
by police in Aceh), 
yaitu Rois (death 
penalty), Ahmad 
Hasan (death 
penalty), Apuy, 
and Sogir alias 
Abdul Fatah . 
12 December 
2004 
Immanuel Church in 
Palu, Central 
Sulawesi 
No Victim   
21 March 2005 Batumerah, Ambon No victim Wahyu alias Rusli 
Mardhani alias Uci 
alias Farid alias 
Zulfikar  
8 June 2005 In front of Abu Jibril 
alias M Iqbal’s (One 
of decision makers 
of Majelis 
Mujahidin 
Indonesia) house in 
Pamulang, 
Tangerang. 
No victim   
12 October 2005 Raja Bar, Kuta and 
Jimbaran Café, Bali. 
Some suicide bombs 
exploded in some café 
caused 22 people killed, 
and 102 people injured. 
Amrozi (death 
penalty), Dwi 
Widiyanto, Moh 
Olyly, Anif Solihin 
dan Abdul Aziz 
(all are in prison), 
Muhammad Salik 
Firdaus, the 
suicide bomber in 
Kafé Nyoman, and 
Misno alias Wisnu, 
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the suicide bomber 
in Kafe Menega. 
31 December 
2005 
In Tentena market, 
Palu.  
A bomb exploded in the 
market, caused 8 people 
died and 45 people 
wounded. 
Upik Lawang and 
Taufik Buraga.  
17 July 2009 Hotel JW Marriot 
and Hotel Ritz 
Carlton. 
A suicide bomb exploded 
inside the building and 
killed 9 people and injured 
more than 50 people. 
Dani Dwi 
Permana, Nana 
Ikhwan Maulana 
Noordin M Top, 
and Ibrohim  
2 March 2010 Aceh Paramilitary training in 
Aceh done by some 
terrorist that have been 
trained in Pakistan. 
 
8 August 2010 A bank in Jl. 
Aksara, Medan, 
North Sumatera. 
A military and two bank’s 
security officer were shot 
by some people that 
predicted as member of 
terrorist group. 
Tony Togar (in 
prison) 
21 September 
2010 
Sector Police office 
in Medan  
Three police officers were 
shot and killed with long 
shot guns. 
Abu Tholut 
16 March 2011 Ulil Abshar Abdala, 
an activist of 
Jaringan Islam 
Liberal (JIL), the 
musician Ahmad 
Dhani, General 
Komisaris Pol 
Gorries Mere, Yapto 
S. Soerjosoemarno, 
and previous Chief 
of West Java 
District Police. 
The terrorist used book 
parcel bombs to terror. 
Still on seeking.  
15 April 2011 In At Taqwa 
mosque, Cirebon, 
during the prayer. 
Suicide Bomb, done by a 
young man, who was 
prayed together with many 
people, including the 
police.  
 
 
II.2  The Evolution of Terrorism in Indonesia 
From the table above, we can see that there are some changes in the attacks of 
terrorist group in Indonesia. Until the year 2005, the terrorist group mostly used 
assembled bomb in making terror to the people, except for the first Hotel JW Marriot 
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Bombing in 2003, Bali Bombing in 2002 and 2005. However they changed it into the 
suicide bombs in the year 2009 as they bombed Hotel JW Marrriot and Ritz Carlton, 
and eventually they used weapons and small guns to attack the government as well as 
the police after the raid in paramilitary training in Aceh, 2010.  
Thus from the explanations below, we can figure out that at least there are three 
aspects that have changed in terms of the terrorism actions in Indonesia; the method 
they use to terror, the target that aimed to terror and also the motivation in running 
their activities.  
 
III.2.1  The Method  
From the first attack of terrorism until the year 2005, we can see obviously 
that almost all of the terrorism performers in Indonesia used assembled bombs that 
put in some places or buildings in running their activities. Some of these bombs 
covered by plastic bags and put in the buildings that aimed to be bombed by the 
terrorist such as that happened in some bombed churches in Jakarta, Bekasi, 
Sukabumi, Bandung, Mojokerto, Medan, Batam and Pekanbaru during the 
Christmas Eve 2000. The terrorist also put a bomb in a car as that occurred in 
front of Australian Embassy in September 2004.  
It was convinced that the bombs were assembled by Dr. Azahari, who was 
shot by the police in a raid in Kali Batu, 2005 and Dulmatin, dead in a raid in 
Temanggung, March 2010. They used potassium chlorate, kalium chlorate, 
trinitrotoluene (TNT), aluminium and sulfur that believed can increase the 
velocity and effect of the explosion produced by TNT.  
Other bomb assemblers were Upik Lawang and Taufik Buraga who 
suspected as designers of the bombs in Tentena Market in Central Sulawesi and in 
Kawua, Poso, in 2006. Different from what happened in Bali, in Kawua they put 
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the assembled bomb in a flashlight and exploded once anyone pressed the “on” 
button. This flashlight bomb caused 1 person died. 
However, the terrorist also used another method by using bombs in terms of 
making terror. They used suicide bombs. In this way, they put assembled bombs 
in a waistcoat or a rucksack and brought by the performers to the buildings they 
aimed to explode. It happened in Paddy’s café Bali, in Bali Bomb I as well as in 
Raja's Bar and Restaurant, Kuta and Nyoman Café, in Bali Bomb II.  
Some others also used a suicide bomb in a car.  The performers put a bomb 
in a car and drove it near to the building and exploded in a few moments as they 
set it previously. This method used by the terrorist when they exploded a minibus 
in front of Sari Club restaurant, in Bali, October 2002 as well as in Hotel JW 
Marriot in Jakarta, August 2003.   
The suicide bombings were also used by terrorist group in JW Marriot and 
Hotel Ritz Carlton tragedy, in 2009. Dani Dwi Permana, a young man-19 years, 
did it in Hotel JW Marriot while Nana Ikhwan Maulana, 28 years old, brought 
bombs in his suitcase in Hotel Ritz Calrton. The bomb assemblers put nails and 
bolts in the bombs as it believed can enhance the destructive force of the bombs. 
Firthermore, this suicide bomb happened again recently in midst April 2011, in 
mosque At-Taqwa, near the resort police headquarter in Cirebon, West Java. The 
police are now still looking for the bombers. 
The other method used by terrorist in Indonesia is as what happened in 
Aceh. There was a paramilitary training in a forest by using guns and weapons. 
From the raid of the terrorist group in Pamulang, Aceh and North Sumatera, 
Indonesian Police has found some long distance bomb triggers, air rifles, pistols, 
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ammunitions and fire arms such as AK-47, M-16, AK-56, FN, Revolver and 
thousands of bullets.  
From the testimony of Tatang Mulyadi, the police officer whose duty is to 
watch the logistic and weapon warehouse in police headquarters in East Jakarta, it 
is known that he sold some weapons to Ahmad Sutrisno, the connector to 
Mohammad Sofyan Saori. Sofyan used to be the police officer who was fired in 
2009 because he chose to join jihad. Sofyan then known joined the paramilitary 
training in Aceh.  
Moreover, Tatang admitted that he has received Rp. 200 million from 
Sutrisno for selling those weapons. Sutrino, himself has made transaction with 
Sofyan 17 times and sold 24 weapons altogether, with varied price from 5 to 10 
million rupiah. 23 Sofyan then sold those 24 long and short barrel weapons to 
Dulmatin. There were AR 15, AK 47, AK 58, and FN Broning completed with the 
bullets. Sofyan received Rp. 375 million altogether for this transaction from 
Dulmatin.24  
From the above explanation then we can see that terrorist group now uses 
both the assembled bombs and weapon to carry out their activities. Unfortunately, 
the terrorist got these weapons easily from the police. Simply by paying some 
numbers of rupiah to the police then they got the weapons they wanted, to 
continue their plan and activities in this country.  
The terrorist usually gets their fund from some donors. These donors mostly 
come from the people in Indonesia who are sympathetic to their goals or support 
                                                
23  ”Senjata Teroris diambil dari Gudang POLRI” (Terrorist’s Weapons Took from Police 
Warehouse) accessed from http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/211245-senjata-teroris-
diambil-dari-gudang-polri, 15 April 2011 
24  ”Bekas Polisi Jual Senjata ke Dulmatin” (Former Police Office Sold Weapons to Dulmatin) 
accessed from http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/211212-bekas-polisi-jual-senjata-ke-
dulmatin, 15 April 2011 
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them with certain interest. Yet, many of them never realize that this fund will be 
used for terrorist activities, said Wawan Purwanto, the intelligent observer.25 The 
terrorist simply used the strategy to collect fund for social or religious charity but 
then corrupted it.  
In this case, Densus 88 has caught Abdullah Sonata, the fund seeker for 
terrorist cell in Indonesia and has brought Abu Bakar Ba’asyir to the trial. The 
police accused Ba’asyir has provided funds to terrorist group, particularly in 
training in Aceh, though he denied it. While doing this research, the trial of Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir regarding this matter is still on processing.  
Some fund providers also come from abroad, though according to Wawan 
not as many as that come from domestic.26 This referred to Al Qaeda. The 
previous Head of Indonesian Intelligent Agency, AM Hendropriyono predicted 
that all suicide bombings in Indonesia linked to Al Qaeda, both in methods and 
funding.27 This fund mostly used to develop terrorist network in Indonesia, in 
terms of observation to the target, infiltration and penetration, members 
recruitment, network creating and network development.  
Besides, terrorist group gets money also from robbery or stealing such as 
that happened in Medan, 2010. Chief of Indonesian Police, Gen. Bambang 
Hendarso Danuri explained that the robbers tried to get some money to finance 
their terror activities. Then they would use the money to purchase bombs’ 
                                                
25 “Abdullah Sonata Diduga Pencari Dana bagi Teroris di Indonesia” (Abdullah Sonata Predicted as the 
Fund Seeker for Terrorist in Indonesia), accessed from 
http://www.primaironline.com/berita/politik/abdullah-sonata-diduga-pencari-dana-bagi-teroris-
indonesia/print on 28 April 2011. 
26  Ibid. 
27  ”Hendro Menduga Al Qaeda Danai Jaringan Terorisme” (Hendro Predicted Al Qaeda Funded 
Terrorism Network) accessed from 
http://rol.republika.co.id/berita/74252/Hendro_Menduga_Al_Qaeda_Danai_Jaringan_Terorisme 
on 28 April 2011 
 
 28 
equipments, weapons and ammunitions to support their activities and achieve their 
goals. 28 
 
III.2.1 The Target 
Not only did the terrorist change in their method but also they changed the target 
they aimed to terror. At the beginning of their attack in this country, the terrorist 
targeted foreigners or westerners, their properties and their interest in Indonesia. 
The embassy of Philippines, the embassy of Malaysia, the embassy of Australia, 
the Australian International School, Hotel J.W Marriot and Hotel Ritz Carlton and 
some cafes in Bali are examples of their target.  
Besides, they also attacked some churches in many areas in Indonesia since 
2000. They attacked the sacred place for Christian since they predicted that 
Christianity as a product that brought by Dutch or colonial which is represented 
western. It happened particularly in Christmas Eve, 2000. There were 23 
churches, located in Batam, Pekanbaru, Jakarta, Sukabumi, Pangandaran, 
Bandung, Kudus, Mojokerto and Mataram were attacked by the terrorist. It 
happened again in 2001 at Santa Ana Church in Pondok Bambu, Huria Kristen 
Batak Protestant Church in Jatiwaringin, East Jakarta and Petra Church in Koja, 
North Jakarta. In 2004, there was another bombing in a church. It occurred in 
Immanuel Church in Palu, Central Sulawesi. 
Furthermore, the terrorist not only attacked the foreigners or westerners, 
including their properties and interest, but also the people of Indonesia. It can be 
seen when they put bombs in Foundation of the Welfare of Iskandar Muda’s 
Students, Jakarta Stock Exchange, KFC and Mc Donald restaurants in Makassar, 
                                                
28  ”Perampokan CIMB Medan Terkait Terorisme” (Robbery in CIMB Medan Related to Terrorism) 
accessed from http://www.mediaindonesia.com/read/2010/09/21/169756/16/1/Perampokan-CIMB-
Medan-Terkait-Terorisme on 28 April 2011 
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Abu Jibril’s (the member of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) house in Tangerang, 
Tentena market, a bank in Medan, delivered some book parcel bombs to the house 
of Ulil Abshar Abdala, an activist of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) and the musician 
Ahmad Dhani. 
Recently, even the terrorist also targeted their attack to the government who 
considered supporting the interest of western and infidel, such as the police 
officer, military and their properties. The terrorist cell attacked the sector police 
office in Medan, North Sumatera, in September 2010 by shooting some police 
officers who were on duties at that time. It happened again, when there was a 
suicide bomber in a Moslem Prayer on 15 April 2011, in At Taqwa mosque, 
which located in precinct police headquarter in Cirebon.  
Even, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for several times explained that 
some terrorists carried out their military training by using his picture as their 
target. And since the police have found some bombs and ammunitions in Jatiasih, 
Bekasi, in August 2010, they predict that the next target of terrorist group in 
Indonesia is the President, as told by Gen. Edward Aritonang.29  
 
III.2.3 The Motives 
The terrorist in Indonesia seemed also changed their reason in carrying out their 
attack. Despite its sophisticated weapons and professional training, supported by 
the U.S., UK and Australian authorities, Indonesian police remains missed and 
consequently the terrorist attacks continue to take place. Since the creation of 
Coordination Desk for Terrorism Eradication (DKPT) in 2002, later known as 
                                                
29  Serangan Teroris Mengarah ke Presiden (Terrorist’s Attack towards President), accessed from 
http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/hukum/2010/03/21/brk,20100321-234228,id.html on 16 
August 2010. 
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Indonesian National Agency for Counter-Terrorism (BNPT), and Densus 88 in 
2003, Indonesia remains experienced several times of terrorist acts until now. 
This is to suggest that, firstly although Indonesia is about to launch counter-
terrorism law to justify its pre-emptive measures, it has a poor preventive 
strategy. This is in the sense of preventing the spread of jihadist ideology, which 
legalizes the use of violence to achieve their goals. Secondly, there is a lack of 
coordination within security officers and with other agencies as well as with 
public in their counter-terrorism strategy.      
 So far, Densus 88 have arrested more than 650 perpetrators of terror and 
killed the leaders of JII in a number of missions. This might be an outcome of a 
good work of intelligent combined with investigation and hard measurements of 
Densus 88, as confirmed by Tito Carnavian, Deputy of Enforcement and 
Nurturing Capabilities of BNPT.30 The decrease numbers of terrorism actions 
lately, both quality and quantity, coupled with the endorsement of Intelligence 
Law recently show the strengthening and development of the role and capability 
of intelligence institution. The law remains debated and the capability still needs 
to be further proven, yet it justifies the intelligent acts. Therefore, this argues that 
the problem of counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia lies not in the intelligence 
per se but mainly at the preventive program. Although the counter-terrorism 
agencies in Indonesia have developed the capability to prevent further attacks by 
predicting and collecting information of the potential bombings such as happened 
in Bali last March, they still lack of surveillance to the spread of the ideology.  
                                                
30  “Penanganan Terorisme 70% berkat Peran Intelijen” (70% of terrorism handling is due to 
Intelligence) accessed from http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/11/08/03/lpcank-
penanganan-terorisme-70-persen-berkat-peran-intelijen 
 31 
As confirmed by Rohan Gunaratna, to effectively combat the very current 
terrorism, the governmental, inter-governmental and societal response must conduct a 
comprehensive strategy.31 This is to say, first and foremost, state and local 
government should be in accordance with private sector and individuals in countering 
terrorism. Ultimately, all resources of a nation should cooperate to protect their 
territory, domestic population and critical infrastructures from terrorist attacks. This 
ultimately requires the involvement and coordination of security apparatus, intelligent 
agency, military, other ministries, local authorities as well as public. The other 
ministries that are needed in this program involve the education, religion, 
psychological, social and economic ministries. Their cooperation is needed in 
conducting apprehension of terrorists, prevention the spread of the ideology, 
rehabilitation of the ex-jihadist and after rehabilitation care program to prepare ex-
jihadist re-enters the society.  
Secondly, this also suggests that terrorism cannot be managed solely by hard 
approaches but mainly need soft approaches. So far, the Indonesian government has 
these two elements. In addition to Densus 88, the government has also formed a 
national agency, namely BNPT, which arguably conducts a softer approach to 
counter-terrorism. With regards to “soft” approaches, BNPT may look at the counter-
terrorism strategy carried out by the Saudi government. Christopher Boucek, in his 
paper, explains the three programs of soft counter-terrorism strategy that is aimed at 
prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare program.32 
                                                
31  Rohan Gunaratna, “Introduction: Change or Continuity?” in The Changing Face of Terrorism, 
(Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004), pp. 1-17. 
32  Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy,” in Carnegie Papers, 
Middle East Program, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 97, 
September 2008), pp. 1-25. See also Rohan Gunaratna, “De-radicalization Programs around the 
World”, in Combating Terrorism in Libya through Dialogue and Reintegration, March 2010, pp. 7-
8. 
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In Indonesia context, prevention program can be primarily led by Ministry of 
Education coupled with Minister of Religion who runs lectures and programs 
throughout schools and religious schools to educate and warn students from a very 
early to university level about the dangers of extremism and the effects of terrorism 
and violence. This also promotes the nationalism to avoid any violence based on 
religious or ethnicity as Indonesia embraces the motto of “unity in diversity”. 
The rehabilitation strategy is carried out to rehabilitate and reeducate terror 
perpetrators and supporters, religiously and psychologically. For this, BNPT should 
cooperate with religious clerics and scholars coupled with psychologists and social 
researchers to have a dialogue with arrested perpetrators after the completion of 
interrogation phase. The cleric should apply the dialogue in a close and conducive 
way, so that the prisoners may feel being humanized and thus communicate openly. 
Prisoners who have successfully completed the rehabilitation process are 
transferred to after rehabilitation center, to facilitate the transition back to society. 
This also provides opportunities for BNPT to observe whether a candidate is possible 
to release or not. Assistance remains provided after a detainee is released from the 
care center. This is in locating a job and receiving other benefits. The government 
should provide job opportunities so that they can be productive to support themselves 
and their family, and be accepted by the society. This will reduce the possibility of 
going back to their former groups. The provision of job opportunity applies to 
preventive actions as well. The access to a better economy and education will 
essentially reduce the possibility of terrorist recruitments. 
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III 
The Development of Terrorism in Indonesia and  
Counter-Terrorism 
 
III.1 Background 
Many terrorist observers have praised of Indonesian government for its counter-
terrorism strategy. Indeed, Sydney Jones mentioned that Indonesia is the best country 
on the efforts of counter-terrorism.33 Credit is given to the provision of law and hard 
counter-measurements in Indonesia. Supported mainly by the United States (U.S.), 
Australia and United Kingdom (UK), the Indonesian police, particularly Special 
Detachment 88 (Densus 88), have arguably succeeded to arrest terrorists. This affirms 
that the financial and logistic supports coupled with training from the U.S. 
government through U.S. Diplomatic Security Service, as well as Australian and 
British authorities, have developed the capability and professionalism of Densus 88 in 
countering terrorism in Indonesia. 
Nonetheless, there are some critics who are skeptical of this special detachment. 
One of these claimed that Densus 88 is only good at conducting counter-terrorist 
strategy but not counter-terrorism.34 This suggests that Indonesian police is very 
capable in arresting the perpetrators but cannot prevent terrorists from doing their acts 
nor prevent the bombing for taking place. Despite its sophisticated weapons and 
professional training, Indonesian police continues to miss detection of bombing and 
consequently the terrorist attacks continue to occur. This is also confirmed by 
                                                
33  “Pemberantasan Teroris di Indonesia Terbaik,” (The eradication of terrorism in Indonesia is the 
best) accessed from http://www.antaranews.com/berita/286992/pemberantasan-teroris-di-indonesia-
terbaik. 
34  Kumar Ramakrishna, “US Strategy in Southeast Asia: Counter-Terrorist or Counter-Terrorism?” in 
After Bali: the Threat of Terrorism Southeast Asia, Kumar Ramakrishna and Tan See Seng (eds), 
(Singapore: IDSS, 2003), pp. 305-337. 
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Ansyaad Mbai, Head of the Indonesian National Agency for Counter-Terrorism 
(BNPT).35 Since the creation of DKPT (Coordination Desk for Terrorism Eradication) 
in 2002, later known as BNPT, and Densus 88 in 2003, Indonesia experienced more 
than ten times of terrorist acts.36  
In fact, the terrorist bombings in Indonesia occur almost every year until 2005. 
However, terrorist attack seems to have disappeared between the years 2006 and 
2009. Then, it continues to occur again afterwards. Therefore, this paper will answer 
the question of why the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia could not entirely 
eradicate terrorism in this country. What factors have caused the efforts of counter-
terrorism authorities to be ineffective? And what should the Indonesian government 
do to manage this problem? 
This paper argues that the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia is ineffective 
mainly due to its partially conducted and not coordinated adequately. There are at 
least three factors that resulted in a lack of strategy of counter-terrorism in this 
country. First is the lack of coordination within the Police institutions and with other 
security-related apparatus. Secondly, although Indonesian authorities are about to 
launch the counter-terrorism law to justify its pre-emptive measures, it has a poor 
preventive strategy. Finally the problem lies in the lack of other agencies and public 
engagement in their strategy. These shortcomings cause the Indonesian government to 
fail to eradicate terrorism thus.  
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To examine the argument, this paper adopts the comparative research method. As 
comparative method is to compare particular nations, societies or cultural units,37 this 
paper mainly compares the hard approaches of Indonesian government and the soft 
approaches carried out by Saudi Arabian government, particularly in conducting 
counter-terrorism strategy. The hard approaches carried out by Indonesian 
government refer to the security forces that are deployed in eradicating terrorism. The 
security forces are profoundly good at counter-terrorist but not counter-terrorism. The 
police, through Densus 88, have succeeded to detain more than 600 terror 
perpetrators, but they cannot entirely eradicate the terrorism in Indonesia. Therefore, 
this paper suggests the Indonesian government to look at the soft counter-terrorism 
strategy implemented by Saudi Arabian government.  
Essentially, the Indonesian government needs to combine both the hard and soft 
approaches in her counter-terrorism strategy. In so doing, the government, through 
BNPT, should coordinate all elements of this nation. This includes the security 
apparatus, military, intelligent, other related ministries, religious leaders and public to 
implement a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. The government should also 
effectively implement a holistic and inter-connected strategy. To examine my 
argument, this paper will be divided into four sections. First section describes the 
strategy of countering terrorism that is carried out in Indonesia. The second section 
explains the working ways of Densus 88, which mainly uses hard counter-
measurements. The third section examines the achievements of counter-terrorism 
strategy in Indonesia coupled with its weaknesses. Eventually, this paper examines 
the challenges faced by counter-terrorism agencies in Indonesia by looking at the 
counter-measurements of Saudi Arabian government. 
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III.2 Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia  
Every country has its own perception on threats that originate externally and 
internally. Accordingly, they need to set up their respective policy to protect their 
national interest and homeland security. With regards homeland security, Christopher 
Bellavita defines it as a concerted national effort involving the state and local 
government, combining with the responsibilities of the private sector and individuals 
to prevent and to protect their territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure 
against threats, namely terrorism, man-made and natural hazards, catastrophic events 
and social trends that may disrupt their stability. This is in addition to threats against 
the sovereignty of their state.38  
In the case of Indonesia, which is the focus of this article, terrorism is perceived 
as one of threats that should be managed. In fact, this country has experienced many 
terrorist actions carried out with political and religious purposes. Since its declaration 
of independence, Indonesia has encountered insurgent movements, coupled with 
terrorist actions that challenge her sovereignty. Among these are Darul Islam (DI), 
RMS (the Republic of South Moluccas), PRRI/Permesta and GAM (Aceh Freedom 
Movement). In addition, since 1990s the government of Indonesia has to deal with 
Jemaah Islamiyah Indonesia (JII) that was originated from DI but are arguably more 
radical in the sense of their ideology and methodology.  
JII is perceived as a political-religiously driven terrorist group.39 The ideology 
and strategy of JII were primarily influenced by Al Qaeda as some cadres of this 
movement were trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980. In the training camp, together 
with the Afghanistan and Arab Mujahidin, JII’s members gained their ideology in so-
                                                
38  Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?” in Homeland 
Security Affairs, (vol. IV, No. 2, June, 2008), pp. 1-30. 
39  Kumar Ramakrishna, op.cit, pp. 305-337. Regarding religion and terrorism see also Bruce Hoffman, 
Inside Terrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 81-130.   
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called Salafi Jihadism coupled with military capability. The ideology essentially 
allowed their followers to conduct violence and extreme measures to overthrow their 
government, in achieving their goals, mainly to establish a Khalifah system and 
spread Salafi Jihadism to all Moslems in the world.40 The military training 
accommodated them with a capability to set a military strategy and conduct it for 
achieving their goals.41  
After proclaiming his 1996 and 1998 fatwa, Osama Bin Laden personally invited 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir, the highest leaders of JII, to visit his sanctuary in Afghanistan 
and asked them to support the ultimate purpose of Al Qaeda.42 This is to fight against 
the U.S. and her allies wherever they might be found. Initially, JII applied its strategy 
to gain public support and spread Salafi Jihadism thought through their engagement in 
Poso and Ambon in the late 1990s as there were religious conflicts in this country. 
They then continued their strategy to attack Christians with a series of church 
bombings in 2000-2001 and used religion sentiment as its justification.43 However, Al 
Qaeda’s attack on World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001 ultimately encouraged 
JII to shift their strategy. Consequently, JII stopped attacking Christians and started 
destroying the U.S. and her allies as well as their interests in Indonesia by bombing 
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iconic targets such as embassies, hotels, restaurants, cafes, malls, stock exchanges and 
so forth.44  
Although Indonesia has experienced a number of public terrorist actions carried 
out by JII since 2000,45 it was the first Bali Bombing in October 2002 that forced the 
Indonesian government to include the strategy of the eradication of terrorism in their 
national political and security agenda. Initially, the government of Indonesia 
incorporated legal measures in their counter-terrorism acts. They published the 
Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 1/2002 regarding the criminal act of 
terrorism in accordance with Government Regulation in lieu of Law No. 2/2002 
regarding the procedures for protection of victims and witnesses in the heavy human 
rights violence. Later, these two regulations become Undang-undang (Law) No. 
15/2003 and No. 16/2003. Both laws essentially define terrorism as a criminal that 
related to domestic security.46 Consequently, the agency that has ultimate authority to 
deal with is Indonesian police and subsequently they need to conduct criminal justice 
process prior to arrest of the alleged perpetrators. 
Further, President Megawati Soekarnoputri instructed the Coordinator Minister 
of Political and Security to formulate a set of an integrated and comprehensive policy 
to eradicate the crime of terrorism as well as create a non-structural task force unit to 
support his duty.47 Accordingly, the Coordinator Minister of Political and Security at 
that time, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, formed a Coordination Desk in his ministry to 
coordinate the terrorism eradication, known as Desk Kordinasi Pemberantasan 
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Terorism (DKPT), as he launched a decree no. 26/2002 in November 2002. 
Essentially, this coordination desk consists of Indonesian police, military and 
intelligence that should work together.  
 
 
III.3  The Hard Approaches of Densus 88 
Nonetheless, DKPT could not work effectively and cooperatively so that each unit 
worked separately. As of 2002, there was a debate regarding the distinctive functions 
between Indonesian police and military. It was then suggested that the police should 
have full control in the domestic security and law enforcement while the military had 
to serve the general national security and defence matters. This also had an impact on 
counter-terrorism measures. The simultaneous attacks of terrorist group, coupled with 
investigation process of previous attacks, caused the Indonesian police to launch its 
anti-terror unit. The decree launched by Chief of Indonesian Police no. 30/VI/2003 
justified its creation. It was later known as Special Detachment 88 of Anti-Terror 
(Densus 88).48 
The creation of Densus 88 was initially funded and trained by the U.S. 
government. The U.S. granted about US$ 24 million to form and train this special 
force in 2003. This is not to mention the training, operational assistance and logistic 
support from Australian and British government. As they were primarily trained by 
the U.S. Secret Service, CIA and FBI, the capability of Densus 88 is similar to the 
anti-terror special force in the U.S. In its development, Densus 88 now has about 400 
personnel who have capabilities in investigation, intelligence, bomb squad, strike 
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forces as well as sniper.49 This is all essential for their operation in capturing bombing 
perpetrators and terrorist’s supporters.  
One characteristic of Densus 88 is secrecy in their operation so that only the 
commandant knows all plans and strategy. To some extent, confidentiality is vital as 
they have to raid the terrorists’ sanctuary and catch them without any deterrence. 
However, Thomas Quiggin from Centre of Excellence for National Security, 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) confirms that a globally observed 
obstacle to good intelligence on asymmetric threats such as terrorism is the obsession 
with secrecy. To him the interactions between the press, the administration and 
various intelligence community officials are inevitably. In fact, most of the 
individuals involved outside intelligence agencies knew that there was nothing new in 
the press stories that would aid terrorists in any way.50  
Moreover, secrecy causes security apparatus in other districts and other 
authorities to refrain from fully supporting the operations of Densus 88 as 
misunderstanding may arise. Consequently, they may not reach an optimal outcome. 
Even so, they became victims in some operations due to their lack of information and 
coordination. This happened, for example in 2009, when Densus 88 asked the 
Regional Police in East Java to support them in carrying out its action to arrest Azhari 
in Batu, East Java. The Regional Police had to sterilize the area where Azhari was 
hiding. By the time of their action, some members of the Regional Police did not 
know that they were about to arrest Azhari. This situation might hamper the 
operation. Further, Hendropriyono, the former head of Indonesian intelligence 
agency, also commented that they could have arrested Azhari alive and gotten more 
information from him. It is important for intelligence task, to request for help and 
                                                
49  Ibid., p. 50. 
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coordinate with another anti-terror squad from Indonesian army that is more 
capable.51 
In another occasion, three police officers in sector Hamparan Perak, North 
Sumatera, were murdered as some terrorists attacked their office in September 2010. 
The perpetrators were allegedly members of the group of Abu Tholut, the leader for 
JII military camp in Aceh. Indeed, the terrorists attacked police office as they wished 
to revenge against Densus 88 who has previously arrested and shot several terrorists 
in tacit raids in Tanjung Balai, Deli Serdang and Lampung, near Hamparan Perak. 
The lack of information and coordination caused the police officers to be ignorant and 
unprepared for terrorist attacks to their office.52 Essentially, the lack of coordination 
caused the local authorities and other security agencies, which understand the 
situation and local geography as well as ways to conduct a tacit raid better, cannot 
involve effectively and optimally. 
 
 
III.4  The Achievement of Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia 
Since its creation, Densus 88 has arrested more than 650 perpetrators of terror as well 
as killed the leaders of JII in a number of missions. According to Tito Karnavian, 
Deputy of Enforcement and Nurturing Capabilities of National Agency of Terrorism 
Eradication (BNPT), the success of their efforts mainly depends on the role of 
intelligent combined with investigation and hard measurements of Densus 88.53 This 
confirms that the actions carried out by Densus 88 are strengthened by the capability 
of intelligence in carrying out their role. The success of Densus 88 to arrest Amrozi, 
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the first Bali bomber, in less than 4 weeks after the bombing in October 2002 was 
arguably one of its achievements. From the arrest, police could then catch Ali 
Ghufron, Ali Imron, Ali Fauzi and Imam Samudra several weeks later. 
Despite its efforts in arresting a number of perpetrators, Densus 88 remains failed 
to prevent the bomb attacks. In reality, they kept occurring. Among such attack are 
the bombings at Mc Donald Restaurant in Makasar, December 2002; Hotel JW 
Marriot in Jakarta, August 2003; Australian embassy in Jakarta, January 2004; the 
second Bali Bomb in 2005, Hotel JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton in July 2009 and 
Cirebon Bombing in April 2011. These are the testimonies of the weaknesses of 
intelligence capabilities in countering-terrorism as mentioned by former head of 
Densus 88, Suryadarma Salim.54 This is in addition to the weaknesses of law 
enforcement regarding intelligence as acknowledged by Ansyad Mbaai.55  
However, the decrease in numbers of terrorism actions lately, in terms of both 
quality and quantity, coupled with the endorsement of Intelligence Law recently, 
show the strengthening and development of the role and capability of intelligence 
institution. The law remains debatable and the capability still needs to be proven. Yet, 
it justifies the intelligent acts. Therefore, this paper suggests that the problem of 
counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia lies not in the intelligence per se but mainly in 
the preventive program. The police is still lacking in surveillance, although the 
counter-terrorism agencies in Indonesia have developed the capability to prevent 
further attacks by predicting as well as collecting information of the potential 
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bombings such as those which happened in Bali last March,56 and the government is 
about to launch counter-terrorism law to justify its pre-emptive measures.57. Their 
failure lies in the preventing the spread of the Jihadist ideology, which justifies the 
use of violence to achieve their goals.      
Amongst Southeast Asia countries, Indonesia suffered the most from JII attacks. 
This is because JII originated from Darul Islam that aimed to establish Indonesian 
Islamic State.58 Although this movement was defeated when Indonesian government 
executed the leader, Kartosuwirjo, in 1962, his ideology was still embraced and 
developed by his followers, including Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir. 
Both of them were Yemeni descendants, used to be committees of Al Isryad, which is 
one of modernist movements in Indonesia, and later became founder of JII.59  
Sungkar and Baasyir coupled with their cadres had spread the ideology of Salafi 
Jihadism in Indonesia through dakwah (preaching) either in the Mosque or in their 
cell groups meeting. They also published ‘Jihadist’ books and built pesantrens and 
madrasah (Islamic schools) with their ideology.60 In accordance with their strategy, 
JII has ultimately introduced the ideology and to gain sympathy and support from the 
public. The latter comprises financial support, logistic and human resources. 
Consequently, it is difficult to predict how much of this ideology has spread and 
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influenced the people, mainly in rural areas in West and Central Java, as this region 
used to be a base for DI.  
Although the government, through BNPT, has conducted de-radicalization 
program to detainees61 and seminars to prevent the radicalism in universities,62 it 
cannot entirely stop the terrorism acts so far. To some extent the program is also 
rejected by Islamic movements, including Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) in Solo.63 
The government may use the ex-jihadists and ulamas to de-radicalize the terrorists. 
However the acts of terrorists keep on occurring. This is not to say that the de-
radicalize program run by the government fails. Yet, the government misses the point.  
 
 
III.5  The Future Challenges of Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Indonesia 
As mentioned earlier, a homeland security strategy involves a concerted national 
effort of state and local government who act in accordance with private sector and 
individuals. Similarly, Rohan Gunaratna confirms that to effectively combat the very 
current terrorism, the governmental, inter-governmental and societal response must 
conduct a comprehensive strategy.64 This implies, firstly, that terrorism cannot be 
managed solely by hard approaches but needs soft approaches. This also suggests that 
all elements of a nation should cooperate to protect their national interest and internal 
security, particularly in dealing with terrorism. Eventually, for an effective counter-
terrorism measurement, government must conduct a holistic and interconnected action 
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against terrorist groups at all stages, from the pre-formative to the post-destruction 
phase. 
So far, the Indonesian government has conducted two approaches of counter-
terrorism strategy. In addition to Densus 88, the Indonesian government has also 
formed a national agency, namely BNPT, to eradicate terrorism in a ‘softer’ way. The 
government accommodated this agency with President Decree No. 46/2010 regarding 
the creation of BNPT and its tasks. As mentioned in the decree, BNPT is primarily in 
charge to formulate a policy, strategy and program in eradication of terrorism, which 
includes prevention, protection, and de-radicalization. Therefore, this paper suggests 
the Indonesian government to look at the “soft” counter-terrorism strategy carried out 
by the Saudi government. It is called ‘soft’ as the Saudi government involves other 
ministries rather than merely security forces. Christopher Boucek, in his paper, 
explains the three interconnected programs of counter-terrorism strategy that is aimed 
at prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare.65  
In so doing, the Indonesian government should activate all her resources. This 
ultimately requires the involvement and coordination of security apparatus, intelligent 
agency, military, other ministries, local authorities as well as public. The other 
ministries that are needed in this program involve education, religion, psychological, 
social and economic ministries. Their cooperation is needed in conducting detention 
of terrorists, prevention of the spread of the ideology, rehabilitation of the detainees 
and after rehabilitation care program to prepare ex-jihadist in re-entering the society.  
In Indonesia context, prevention program can be primarily led by Ministry of 
Education who runs a lecture and program throughout schools from a very basic to 
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university levels as the majority of the extremists in Indonesia are young people. This 
program contains education and warning about the dangers of extremism as well as 
the impact of terrorism and violence. This also promotes nationalism that will prevent 
any violence that is based on religious or ethnicity as Indonesia embraces the motto of 
“unity in diversity”. Further, in particular events, the government may distribute 
books, pamphlets and other materials regarding the program to enlighten students’ 
parents and families. The government and schools should also take some steps to 
combat recruitment and deployment of the radical ideology within the school. This 
usually comes from deviant teachers or senior students who exploit their time with 
students by discussing issues out of their courses such as politics as well as religions 
and subsequently spread hatred. 
Ministry of Religions should also run the same program in pesantrens and 
madrasah (Islamic schools). Moreover, they need to supervise books and other 
materials that are used in these schools and take a decisive action on Salafi Jihadists 
books. This is especially important as the police have just found books about 
conducting jihad in Tangerang, West Java.66 In addition, they need to engage 
respected and moderate Ulamas to spread the non-violence ideology such as loving, 
caring and peace of Islam through dakwah (preaching). They may also involve the ex-
jihadists, such as Nassir Abas to join this program and share their experience.  
As for the rehabilitation process, BNPT should cooperate with religious clerics 
and scholars coupled with psychologists and social researchers, and hold dialogues 
with arrested perpetrators after the completion of interrogation phase. The cleric 
should apply the dialogue in a close and conducive way, so that the prisoners may feel 
that they are being humanized and thus communicate openly. The government should 
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also engage ex-JII members who have higher authorities and are more respected by 
the other members, so they may be heard by detainees.67 Once the higher ranking JII 
members change their worldview, as an outcome of this communication, it will 
provide greater opportunity to other members to respect and follow his instruction. 
Further, the psychological and social division is responsible to determine what 
support to give to the prisoners and their families who may need help during and after 
release to society. Similarly, the clerics should remain in contact with the ex-prisoners 
so the former jihadists may continue to study with the ulamas, who were counseling 
them in prison. 
In the aftercare program, the Indonesian government needs to facilitate the lives 
of the detainee when he returns back into life in society. The government may put 
them into a specialized rehabilitation care center for a certain time prior to their return 
to a ‘normal’ life. This also provides opportunities for BNPT to observe whether to 
release a candidate. The government should also provide skill training and job 
opportunities to ex-jihadists so that they can be productive to support themselves and 
their family, and be accepted by the society. This will reduce the possibility of going 
back to their former groups. The provision of job opportunity applies to preventive 
actions as well. The access to a better economy and education will essentially reduce 
the possibility of terrorist recruitments. 
In addition, there is a growing trend for Islamic radical groups to utilize social 
media to spread their ideology and recruit their potential cadres. They also share the 
same grievances about a corrupt and injustice government, which is the foundation to 
                                                
67  Hasibullah Satrawi, “Deradikalisasi Berbasis Ideologi,” (Deradicalization based on Ideology) 
accessed from 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/10/29/03584393/Deradikalisasi.Berbasis.Ideologi 
 48 
their ideology.68 Therefore, role of Ministry of Communication is needed here to 
supervise the activities in social media. Moreover, law enforcement together with 
wholeheartedly efforts to increase the social and economic welfare as well as 
education arguably reduces the concern of potential supporters and sympathizers.  
All of these programs ultimately are carried out as a holistic and interconnected 
strategy. The conduct of this strategy certainly needs cooperation and coordination 
from all elements of this nation. As mentioned in President’s decree, BNPT will take 
responsibility for this. This effort may face challenges as it is not easy to coordinate 
all programs, needs a greater budget, takes a longer term69 and deals with Indonesian 
democracy political system.70 However, with a strong political willingness from 
government, involvement of all state’s elements and inter-governmental cooperation, 
a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, which essentially pays respect to the law 
and human rights, may prevail. 
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IV 
Conclusion 
 
Despite its lack of coordination, Densus 88 has arguably succeeded to raid the 
terrorists’ safe house, arrest the bombing perpetrators and, to some extent, prevent the 
upcoming attacks. Yet the government fails to eradicate terrorist group’s ideology, so 
called Salafi Jihadism, which is the foundation of their actions, and prevent the spread 
of it. Therefore, it is essential for all elements of this nation to cooperate in stopping 
and countering terrorism. The Indonesian government should put an effort to carry out 
soft counter-terrorism, as carried out by Saudi government, which interconnects 
prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare program. This effort should be combined with 
the hard counter-measurement of Densus 88. Consequently, BNPT should coordinate 
not only among the security agencies but also the related Ministries, local authorities 
as well as public which are involved in the program. Essentially, in this reform era, 
the Indonesian government should conduct a holistic and comprehensive counter-
terrorism strategy and this is in such way to respect the law and human rights of 
Indonesia. 
This is to suggest that, firstly although Indonesia is about to launch counter-
terrorism law to justify its pre-emptive measures, it has a poor preventive strategy. 
This is in the sense of preventing the spread of jihadist ideology, which legalizes the 
use of violence to achieve their goals. Secondly, there is a lack of coordination within 
security officers and with other agencies as well as with public in their counter-
terrorism strategy. So far, Densus 88 have arrested more than 650 perpetrators of 
terror and killed the leaders of JII in a number of missions. This might be an outcome 
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of a good work of intelligent combined with investigation and hard measurements of 
Densus 88.  
The decrease numbers of terrorism actions lately, both quality and quantity, 
coupled with the endorsement of Intelligence Law recently show the strengthening 
and development of the role and capability of intelligence institution. The law remains 
debated and the capability still needs to be further proven, yet it justifies the 
intelligent acts. Therefore, this argues that the problem of counter-terrorism strategy 
in Indonesia lies not in the intelligence per se but mainly at the preventive program. 
Although the counter-terrorism agencies in Indonesia have developed the capability to 
prevent further attacks by predicting and collecting information of the potential 
bombings such as happened in Bali last March, they still lack of surveillance to the 
spread of the ideology.  
This ultimately requires the involvement and coordination of security apparatus, 
intelligent agency, military, other ministries, local authorities as well as public. The 
other ministries that are needed in this program involve the education, religion, 
psychological, social and economic ministries. Their cooperation is needed in 
conducting apprehension of terrorists, prevention the spread of the ideology, 
rehabilitation of the ex-jihadist and after rehabilitation care program to prepare ex-
jihadist re-enters the society. Secondly, this also suggests that terrorism cannot be 
managed solely by hard approaches but mainly need soft approaches. So far, the 
Indonesian government has these two elements. In addition to Densus 88, the 
government has also formed a national agency, namely BNPT, which arguably 
conducts a softer approach to counter-terrorism. With regards to “soft” approaches, 
BNPT may look at the counter-terrorism strategy carried out by the Saudi 
government.  
 51 
In Indonesia context, prevention program can be primarily led by Ministry of 
Education coupled with Minister of Religion who runs lectures and programs 
throughout schools and religious schools to educate and warn students from a very 
early to university level about the dangers of extremism and the effects of terrorism 
and violence. This also promotes the nationalism to avoid any violence based on 
religious or ethnicity as Indonesia embraces the motto of “unity in diversity”.  
The rehabilitation strategy is carried out to rehabilitate and reeducate terror 
perpetrators and supporters, religiously and psychologically. For this, BNPT should 
cooperate with religious clerics and scholars coupled with psychologists and social 
researchers to have a dialogue with arrested perpetrators after the completion of 
interrogation phase. The cleric should apply the dialogue in a close and conducive 
way, so that the prisoners may feel being humanized and thus communicate openly. 
Prisoners who have successfully completed the rehabilitation process are transferred 
to after rehabilitation center, to facilitate the transition back to society. This also 
provides opportunities for BNPT to observe whether a candidate is possible to release 
or not. Assistance remains provided after a detainee is released from the care center. 
This is in locating a job and receiving other benefits.  
The government should provide job opportunities so that they can be productive 
to support themselves and their family, and be accepted by the society. This will 
reduce the possibility of going back to their former groups. The provision of job 
opportunity applies to preventive actions as well. The access to a better economy and 
education will essentially reduce the possibility of terrorist recruitments. Thirdly, for 
an effective counter-terrorism measurement, Indonesian government must conduct a 
wholly and interconnected action against terrorist groups at all stages, from the pre-
formative to the post-destruction phase. 
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The conduct of this strategy may face challenges as it is not easy to coordinate 
the program, takes a longer term, needs greater budget and has to deal with 
Indonesian democracy political system. However, with a strong political willingness 
from government and involvement of all state’s elements coupled with inter-
governmental cooperation, a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, essentially 
with respect to the law and human rights, may prevail.  
 
